








Augustine’s Argument for the Existence of God






Augustine and Evodius both subscribe to the doctrine that, in regard to fundamental theological matters, one must first believe before one can understand.​[2]​ Without belief, understanding is impossible. Augustine says:
	
Unless believing is different from understanding, and we first believe the great and divine thing that we desire to understand, the prophet has said in vain, “Unless you believe, you shall not understand.”​[3]​ 
The reference is to Isaiah, chapter 7, verse 9. This verse was mistranslated in the Ancient Latin translation of the Septuagint. In the vulgate, and in present day Bibles, it reads roughly as follows:
Unless your faith is firm you will not endure.
[The idea is that Ahaz is to endure against his enemies.]

Augustine and Evodius accept the mistranslation.​[4]​ Applied to the existence of God it at least initially seems implausible. Do they think that only theists can understand the argument they are about to consider? Do they think that honest open-minded atheists and agnostics will somehow, necessarily, be unable to follow the reasoning?

In order to believe that God exists one must understand the claim that God exists. The belief cannot precede that understanding. In order to accept (or reject) an argument for God’s existence, one must have some grasp of the meaning of the conclusion. 
One possibility is that Augustine takes the mistranslation to mean that in order to find God one must first live in the way of faith.​[5]​ 

…[W]hat is believed without being known cannot be said to have been found, and no one can become fit for finding God unless he believes first what he shall know afterwards.​[6]​
 





In Book 2, Chapter 15, Augustine says to Evodius:

You granted, moreover, that if I showed you something higher than our minds (mentes), you would admit, assuming that nothing existed which was still higher, that God exists. I accepted your condition and said that it was enough to show this. For if there is something more excellent than truth, this is God. If there is not, then truth itself is God.  Whether or not truth is God, you cannot deny that God exists, and this was the question with which we agreed to deal. ​[8]​

If we had proof that there is something (an x) such that x is ‘higher’ (better than, superior to, more perfect than) our minds, would that prove that x is God and thus that God exists? Evodius thinks not. As he sees it, x might be better than any human mind, and yet not be God. This would be the case if there were another thing, y, such that y was even ‘higher’ than x. The idea is that God cannot be inferior to (lower than, etc.) something else.  Necessarily, if God exists then he is the ‘highest’ (most excellent) thing that there is. There is no possible world in which God exists, but ranks second, or third, or…whatever. 
Evodius is not claiming that God is necessarily the highest thing there is, whatever that turns out to be. In principal, it could turn out that some wise old woman living in Peoria Illinois is, as of now, the highest (best, wisest) thing that there is. As I understand it, Evodius thinks there is a sort of threshold such that only something higher than that could properly be called ‘God.’ Augustine here claims that this threshold is the degree of excellence of the human mind. It is necessarily the case that God, if he exists, out-ranks any human mind – perhaps even any possible human mind. And, presumably, if there is something that out-ranks the human mind, then either that is God, or God is something still higher up. 
Strictly speaking this is not what Evodius had accepted. Augustine had asked whether something more excellent than our reason would do the job.

Augustine: What if we should be able to find something which you would not doubt not only exists, but is even more excellent than our reason (ratione)? Will you hesitate to say that, whatever it is, this is our God?
Evodius: If I could find something better than what is best in my nature, I would not immediately say that this is God. I am not inclined to call God that to which my reason is inferior, but rather that to which nothing is superior.​[9]​
Augustine: Clearly. And God Himself has given your reason the power to think so devoutly and truly about Him. But, I ask you, if you find that there is nothing superior to our reason except what is eternal and immutable, will you hesitate to say that this is God? You know that bodies are mutable and that life itself, which animates the body in its varying conditions, is plainly subject to change. Reason itself is clearly proven to be mutable, now struggling to arrive at truth, now ceasing to struggle, sometimes reaching it and sometimes not. If, without the aid of any organ of the body, or of any sense inferior to it, either touch, taste, smell, hearing, or sight, reason discerns that it is inferior and through its own power discerns something eternal and immutable, reason should at the same time admit that it is inferior and that this is God.
Evodius: I shall admit that this is God to which nothing is granted to be superior.
Augustine: Good! It will be sufficient, then, for me to prove that there is something of this nature which you will admit to be God; or, if there is anything superior, you will grant that this superior being is God. Therefore, whether there is something superior or not, it will be proven that God exists when, as I promised, I show with God’s aid that there is something superior to reason.
Evodius: Prove then what you promise.​[10]​
Evodius’ admission is somewhat ambiguous. I take him to be insisting, again, that the eternal and immutable thing can only be regarded as God provided both that it is superior to human reason and that there is nothing superior to it. 





Another, technical, point: Both Augustine and Evodius seem to be assuming that there is something (some existing thing), x, such that there isn’t anything more perfect than x. But couldn’t it be the case that there is no top to this series? Can we be certain that we are not looking for something like the largest prime number? We need to be sure that the series has a top.  In addition, we have to be certain that there is only one thing at the top, and not, say, a dozen things.​[11]​

Here is my (somewhat modified) version of the argument Augustine provides for Evodius..

Abbreviate ‘Immutable Truth’ as ‘IT’.
 
 (1) If there is an x such that x is superior to the human mind, and there is no y such that y is equal or superior to x, then x is God.
 (2) There is an x such that there is no y such that y is equal or superior to x.  [This is to insure that the series has a unique top.]
 (3) IT is superior to the human mind and has no equal.
 (4) Either there is an x such that x is superior to IT, or there is no such x.
 (5) If there is no x such that x is superior to IT, then IT is God.
  (6) If there is an x such that x is superior to IT, and there is no y such that y is equal or superior to x, then x is God.
  (7) Hence there is an x such that x is God.





I take it that ‘immutable truths’ are necessary truths, and that they can be known a priori.  

Augustine discusses the ‘doubling’ function as applied to the positive integers.  How do we double a given integer, n? He suggests that we consider how far away from zero n is, and then we move that same distance further on from n. Applying this rule to the positive integers starting at one, we get D1 = 2, D2 = 4, D3 = 6, and so one. As Augustine says, in effect, the double of any number, n is the same distance to the right of n as n is from zero. But how do we know this to be true? How do we know, for instance, that this will be true in regard to very very large positive integers?
Through all of the rest of the numbers you will find the same thing that is found in the first pair of numbers, one and two, namely, the double of any number is as many times after this number as such a number is from the beginning.  How do we discern that this fact which holds for the whole number series is unchangeable, fixed, and incorruptible? No one perceives all the numbers by any bodily sense, for they are innumerable. How do we know that this is true for all numbers? Through what fantasy or vision do we discern so confidently the firm truth of number throughout the whole innumerable series, unless by some inner light unknown to bodily sense?​[12]​

 There is something mysterious about this realm. Augustine says:

When I think about the unchanging truth of numbers, and when I consider the province of numbers—their room or sanctuary, as it were, or whatever suitable name can be found by which we may designate the home or seat of numbers–I am far removed from my body. I may, perhaps, find something about which I can think, but it is nothing that I can express in words; as though exhausted, I return to familiar things, so as to be able to speak, and I speak of objects before my eyes, objects that it is usual to speak of. The same thing happens to me when I think as carefully and intently as I can about wisdom.​[13]​

Mathematics is not the only source of immutable truths. The ‘rules of wisdom,’ that is to say the practical rules by which we should live, are themselves immutable truths, and, in some way, they are close to mathematics.  Here, according to Augustine, are some rules of wisdom:

(1)	We should seek wisdom.
(2)	We should live justly.
(3)	The incorrupt is better than the corrupt.
(4)	The worse should be subordinate to the better.
(5)	Equals should be compared with equals.




The true and immutable rules of wisdom are as true and immutable as the rules of number, whose order and truth, you [Evodius] have said, are unchangeably present and common to all who see them. When asked about a few of these rules of wisdom individually, you replied that they were evidently true, and you admitted that they are present and common for all to see who have the power to see them.

So what is IT? One might take Augustine to be thinking of ethical and mathematical truths taken all together as a sort of lump or set. However, many of the things he says make it quite clear that he is thinking of something like the Platonic form, the ‘idea,’ that all those truths share or reflect – Immutable Truth itself.​[14]​ Here is an example:

….when the rapier edge of the mind cuts through the many true and immutable things with its sure reason, it steers towards the very truth, by which all things are revealed; clinging to truth as if forgetful of all else, it enjoys everything at once in its enjoyment of truth. Whatever is delightful in other truths derives its delightfulness from truth itself. [Ibid. p. 68]

Suppose this Platonic, or neo-platonic, picture of IT is correct. Suppose that IT really exists and is as wonderful, awe inspiring, sublime as Beauty Itself (see Plato’s Symposium). It would follow, I guess, that IT was worthy of something like worship. Perhaps one could, with good reason, take as one’s ultimate aim, or purpose, to live in its light, so to speak.  Suppose, further, that IT is the highest, greatest, thing there is. Given all these things, it still doesn’t follow that we should call IT ‘God.’ I think we should be reluctant to do so, even in the absence of other contenders. It would certainly be misleading. We have been given no reason to think that IT (or, for that matter Beauty Itself) created the universe.​[15]​ Presumably, neither one has any interest in our well-being, nor can either one ‘hear’ our prayers.​[16]​ 

Is IT superior to our minds?

Augustine offers an argument for the claim that IT is something ‘higher than’ (supra) our minds. The argument has the following structure.

(a)	IT is either more excellent than our minds, less excellent than our minds, or equally excellent.
(b)	IT is not less excellent.
(c)	 IT is not equally excellent.
(d)	Hence IT is more excellent than our minds.


In defense of premise (b) he says: “If it were less excellent, we would make judgments about it, not according to it.” His claim is that we make judgments according to it. This supports the idea that he is thinking of IT as a Platonic, or neo-Platonic, form: Immutable Truth itself, and thus a standard or ideal by which statements, claims, and so on are appraised, so to speak.
In defense of premise (c) he says: 
If truth were equal to our minds, it would be subject to change. Our minds sometimes see more and sometimes less, and because of this we acknowledge that they are mutable. Truth, remaining in itself, does not gain anything when we see it, or lose anything when we do not see it. It is whole and uncorrupted. With its light, truth gives joy to the men who turn to it, and punishes with blindness those who turn away from it.​[17]​

This gives us premise (3).

…I had promised, if you recall, that I would prove that there is something more sublime than our mind and reason. Here it is: the truth itself.

The rest [(4) –(7)] seems to be smooth sailing.

As it turns out, Augustine belives that IT is, in fact, God – that there isn’t anything ‘higher’ than, or equal to IT. He thinks that Jesus is IT, as he [Jesus] presumaby claimed [John, ch. 14, vs 6].  But, it seems to me, Augustine doesn’t even pretend to offer any proof for this addition to the argument. The argument, as  I said, ends with a disjunct.


Some possible objections to Augustine’s argument 

(a) Premise (1) of the argument is open to doubt. It seems quite possible that there should be minds vastly superior to ours (like the minds of angels, perhaps) and yet there be no God.​[18]​ It might be a good idea to re-write premise (1) substituting reason (per se - human or angelic) for the human mind.​[19]​ This, I think, would make the premise more plausible.

(b) In regard to premise (2), we have been given no reason to suppose that the series has a unique top. Couldn’t there be a substantial number of equally superior beings up there?

(c)	It is not clear, or obvious, that a Platonic, or Neo-Platonist, item called ‘Immutable Truth’ actually exists – that there is such a thing. There certainly are alternative, fairly plausible, theories of truth.​[20]​





^1	  Scott MacDonald and Gareth Matthews discuss this argument in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, edited by Eleanor Stump and Norman Kretzmann, Cambridge University Press, 2001.  Both papers are interesting and insightful; but both seem primarily interested in what it reveals about Augustine’s view of God.  Neither one tries to spell out the central part of the argument in a way that is valid and plausible.
^2	  This is Anselm’s view too. See the last sentence of Proslogium Chapter 1. Anselm uses it in more or less the same context.
^3	  Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S. Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff, The Library of Liberal Arts, 1964, p. 39.
^4	   I think Anselm follows Augustine here.
^5	  See Norman Kretzmann’s very helpful paper “Faith Seeks, Understanding Finds”, in Christian Philosophy, edited by Thomas Flint, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1990, pp. 1 – 36.
^6	  Augustine, above.
^7	  I take this to be the view defended by John Rist in “Faith and reason” in The Cambridge Companion To Augustine, edited by Eleanor Stump and Norman Kretzmann, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 26- 39.
^8	  Augustine, above p. 71.
^9	  Bob Wengert, suggested a slight change in the translation.
^10	  Ibid. p. 49.
^11	  In his Monologion, Chapter 1, Anselm offers an argument (not the ontological argument  and not the argument examined in this paper) for the existence of God  -  a thing that is supremely good and “has no equal and no superior.”  In the Prologue to the Monologion, Anselm says, or at least implies, that, in the Monologion, he is only expounding Augustine’s view as expressed in On the Trinity.
^12	   Ibid. p. 56. For more on this topic see Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: an Elementary Exposition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.
^13	  Ibid. pp. 62 - 63.
^14	  ‘Immutable Truth’ (or ‘Eternal Truth’) is a component, or aspect, of one member of the Plotinus trinity: The One, Intellect, and Soul. Immutable Truth is an aspect of Intellect. I think it is quite clear that Augustine has something like Plotinus’ ‘Immutable Truth’ in mind when he uses the phrase.
^15	  Augustine believes that God made every good thing that is not God.  
^16	  Given Platonic metaphysics, should we focus our worship on the demi-urge? After all, supposedly, he is the creator, and, perhaps, can hear our prayers. My suggestion is that we should not. I say this following Evodius’s lead. Given that Beauty Itself, and/or the Good Itself, are superior to the demi-urge, it seems wrong to make the demi-urge the principal focus of our religion. 
^17	  Ibid. p. 67.
^18	  Suppose there are two billion of these creatures, and one of them is the best of the lot. Would that one automatically be God? Suppose that these creatures, working together, created the physical universe. Would that help?
^19	   We might then claim that reason seeks truth, and is related to it, in a way similar to the way Eros seeks and is related to Beauty.  The idea has mythological plausibility.
^20	  For a more or less contemporary discussion of the nature of truth see, for instance, Michael Devitt’s Realism and Truth, Second Edition, Princeton University Press, 1991. Colin McGinn offers an interesting theory of truth in Logical Properties, Clarenden Press, Oxford, 2000,
^21	  Percy Bysshe Shelly (a Platonist) might well have said: “I’m definitely an atheist; but I believe in Beauty, Truth, and Goodness.” Would this have been absurd?
